We analyze the behavior of a monopolistic firm in general equilibrium when the firm's decision are taken through shareholder voting. We show that, depending on the underlying distribution, rational voting may imply overproduction as well as underproduction, relative to the efficient level. Any...

This paper focuses on how attitudes affect entrepreneur’s strategy selection at the organizational level. It also attempts to discover if contingencies exist in this relationship that may account for differences in firm performance. The model developed, based on the existing literature, is...

Traditional models of consumer choice assume consumers are aware of all products for sale.This assumption is questionable, especially when applied to markets characterized by a high degree of change, such as the personal computer (PC) industry. I present an empirical discrete-choice model of...

A fundamental issue in governance research is how boards can be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO but yet can still be somewhat effective in monitoring the CEO. We offer an answer based on a model in which board effectiveness is a function of the board's independence....

This paper builds a model of fragmented duopsony in backward agriculture following Basu and Bell (1991) in which the purchasers (traders) have captive markets each but compete in a contested market. We focus on the formation of captive markets through trader-farmer interlinkage in the form of...

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...

We discuss the case of a monopolist of a base good in the presence of complementary goods provided either by it or by other firms. We assess and calibrate the extent of the influence on the profits from the base good that is created by the existence of complementary goods, i.e., the extent of...

Previous literature has mostly considered R&D and licensing activities separately. In this paper we examine the effect of licensing on R&D and social welfare. We show that the effect of licensing on the incentive for doing R&D is ambiguous and depends on the costs of doing R&D. We also show that...