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Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling

Feltovich, Nick; Harbaugh, Rick; To, Ted - EconWPA - 1998

In sender--receiver games high--quality types can distinguish themselves from low--quality types by sending a costly signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We examine equilibria where medium types separate themselves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550943

Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - EconWPA - 2002

competition among them allowed by the market rules. We show that the latter plays an even more important role. With intense … competition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large … of competition (presence of clienteles), collusive equilibria, where information is never revealed, also exist, whatever …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118623

Advertising, Pricing & Market Structure in Competitive Matching Markets

Bataille, Edner; Julien, Benoit - EconWPA - 2005

This paper develops a model of pricing and advertising in a matching environment with capacity constrained sellers. Sellers' expenditure on directly informative advertising attracts consumers only probabilistically. Consumers who happen to observe advertisements randomize over the advertised...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076903

Learning, Matching and Aggregation

Hopkins, Ed - EconWPA - 1995

Fictitious play and ``gradient'' learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062332

A general model of best response adaptation

Berger, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2003

We develop a general model of best response adaptation in large populations for symmetric and asymmetric conflicts with role-switching. For special cases including the classical best response dynamics and the symmetrized best response dynamics we show that the set of Nash equilibria is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062353

A Learning Approach to Auctions

Hon-Snir, Shlomit; Monderer, Dov; Sela, Aner - EconWPA - 1996

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062361

Some Notes on Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities

Berger, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2004

Fictitious play is the classical myopic learning process, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class of games including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond dominance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407536

False Reputation in a Society of Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Kalai, Ehud - EconWPA - 1997

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541

Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Earlier experiments have shown that under little information subjects are hardly able to coordinate even though there are no conflicting interests and subjects are organised in fixed pairs. This is so, even though a simple adjustment process would lead the subjects into the efficient, fair and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407575

Bayesianism without Learning

Samet, Dov - EconWPA - 1999

According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407613

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