Similar Search Results

Political renegotiation of regulatory contracts

Aubert, Cecile; Laffont, Jean- Jacques - EconWPA - 2005

Governmental contracts may be renegotiated after political changes. Current governments can anticipate this and strategically distort contracts to influence renegotiation outcomes. In this sequential common agency game, the initial contract impacts elements of the renegotiation process: outside...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407570

Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?

Ramseyer, J. Mark; Rasmusen, Eric - EconWPA - 1999

Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 percent -- why? On the one hand, because Japanese prosecutors are badly understaffed they may prosecute only their strongest cases and present judges only with the most obviously guilty defendants. On the other, because Japanese judges can be reassigned by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076633

Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media

Suphachalasai, Suphachol - EconWPA - 2005

corruption. We develop a bureaucratic model of corruption with mass media. A representative profit maximizing media firm seeks … for corruption news to be printed and sold. Channels through which competition in media industry and press freedom affect … equilibrium corruption in a bureaucracy are modeled. Different degrees of media freedom and competition affect production and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560959

Optimal Auditing Under Intermediated Contracting

Gick, Wolfgang - EconWPA - 2004

This paper builds on Faure-Grimaud and Martimort’s [Economics Letters 71 (2001) 75-82] analysis of intermediated contracting. I argue that intermediated contracting permits one form of auditing, in which the sub-contract offered to the firm is examined, contingent on the intermediary’s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135017

The Role of Contextual Clues in the Creation of Information Overload

Kimble, Chris; Hildreth, Paul; Grimshaw, David J - EconWPA - 2005

There has been an explosion of new forms of communications media for interpersonal communication. There is anecdotal evidence of people suffering from 'information overload' as a result of these developments. This paper presents the results from, and analysis of, a case study of a perceived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407519

Credible Communication in Dynastic Government

Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2002

This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in {\em dynastic governments}. It has been suggested that ``horizontal accountability," i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of information....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407554

Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth

Caffera, Marcelo; Dubra, Juan - EconWPA - 2005

We study the problem of a regulator who must control the emissions of a given pollutant from a series of industries when the firms' abatement costs are unknown. We develop a mechanism in which the regulator asks firms to report their abatement costs and implements the most stringent emissions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561784

Optimal Collective Contract Without Peer Monitoring

Daripa, Arup - EconWPA - 2005

If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, individual lending is inefficient. The literature emphasizes improvements through non-market organizations that harness local information through peer monitoring. I investigate the complementary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124858

The Political Economy of Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information

Dhami, Sanjit - EconWPA - 2001

This paper examines the political economy of redistribution when voters have asymmetric information about the redistributive preferences of politicians and the latter cannot make credible policy commitments. The candidates in each party are endogenously selected by a process of Nash Bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407535

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Variable Skill Levels

Pollak, Andreas - EconWPA - 2004

I study the consequences of heterogeneity of skills for the design of an optimal unemployment insurance, using a principal-agent set-up with a risk neutral insurer and infinitely lived risk averse agents. Agents, who are characterised by different productivities or skills, are employed by firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408328

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last