In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies in...

We investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an opportunity for him to match his opponent's bid in exchange for a bribe. In particular, we examine two types of corruption arrangements. In the first case, the auctioneer...

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in...

Suppose a seller wants to sell $k$ similar or identical objects and there are $nk$ potential buyers. Suppose that buyers want only one object. (This is a reasonable assumption in the sale of condominiums or in the sale of government-owned residential units to low-income families). In this case,...

In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants. After seeing their values for the object, bidders decide whether or not to enter the auction. Players may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize the...

We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. Indeed, cooperation in R&D may be accompanied by high concentration in the product market. We show that while such...