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An Economic Model of Youth Smoking: Tax and Welfare Effects

Suranovic, Steven M. - EconWPA - 2005

This paper presents a model of smoking choice in which rationality is bounded by limitations in intertemporal computational abilities. The model is applied to the youth decision to initiate smoking. Lifetime smoking paths of representative smokers indicate that youths may experience a reduction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134613

Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games

McCabe, Kevin; Rigdon, Mary; Smith, Vernon - EconWPA - 2004

It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Players are typed based on their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125594

Reciprocal fairness and gift exchange practices in the labor

Mahuteau, Stephane - EconWPA - 2002

. We use the concept of Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium developed by Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) to incorporate … players’ preferences for reciprocity in their utility function. We model the labor relation through a one shot sequential gift … by reciprocity. Even though intentions act as a catalyst of opportunistic behaviors, the respect of the equity norm makes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408349

Preference Evolution and Reciprocity

Sethi, Rajiv; Somanathan, E. - EconWPA - 1999

This paper provides an evolutionary theory of reciprocity as an aspect of preference interdependence. It is shown that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550958

Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity

Zwick, Rami; Rapoport, Amnon - EconWPA - 1999

Tacit coordination is studied experimentally in a class of iterated market entry games with a relatively small number of potential entrants (n = 6), symmetric players, and fixed entry fees. These games are intended to simulate a situation where a newly emergent market opportunity may be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408234

Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - EconWPA - 2005

We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556670

Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining

Slembeck, Tilman - EconWPA - 1999

This paper reports experimental evidence on behaviour in an Ultimatum Game where responders have low structural information and feedback so that they have to learn the nature of the game during repeated play. The results lend support to the view that certain learning conditions are less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125583

Universally Stable Adjustment Processes - A Unifying Approach

Herings, P.J.J. - EconWPA - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125648

Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Wilkie, Simon - EconWPA - 2002

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134969

ames and Information, Third Edition, Preface

Rasmusen, Eric - EconWPA - 1999

I am revising my game theory book, which is due at the publisher's September 1, 1999. This is the preface, which discusses changes I have made.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135102

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