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In environments where regulations are lax and controls function badly, cleanly participating in tenders is irrational. An increase in one single firm’s propensity to bribe induces the same behaviour upon the others (“bad apple effect”), and the likelihood of firms to bribe tends to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408440
This note examines the Integrity Pact (IP) methodology proposed by Transparency International to confront the problem of corruption in public procurement. The examination draws from a decision model for participants developed elsewhere, in which the critical elements are shown to be the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556938
A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller …’s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely … bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413299
The prisoner’s dilemma is sometimes invoked to describe the situation facing participants in tenders. Reasoning on the basis of the dilemma metaphor, it is contended that agreeing not to bribe public officials in order to win contracts (collaboration) leads to better outcomes than bribing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125994
We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of collusion and symmetric mergers among bidders … demonstrate that, in average value auctions, this leads to more aggressive bidding. On the other hand, since collusion decreases … the number of active bidders, competition is lessened, reducing the price paid at auction. We demonstrate that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407619
asset that is too large or too risky for a single individual or financial institution so that an auction method is not … and a SS is provided. The difference between an auction scheme and a subscription scheme is discussed. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134756
private and common valuations as special cases. We show that the key determinant of bidders' surplus (and implicitly auction … format of the auction matters. If bidders have constant marginal utilities for objects up to some limit, then uniform price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135082
We investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an … arrangements, corruption affects both bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue in a first-price auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413265
It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization or a vertical structure creates efficiency … losses, and hence should be prevented. This paper shows that whenever collusion takes the form of co-insurance agreements …, collusion yields only a redistribution of surplus among the members of the vertical structure. Hence, its efficiency costs may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118550
We introduce ex-ante collusion whereby the supervisor stops monitoring for a transfer payment from the agent, in … addition to ex-post collusion following the monitoring outcome. Extending a well-known model of hierarchy, we study the … determinants of ex-ante collusion and show that, depending on the parameter values we identify, the principal can ignore either ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118551