The literary source of the main ideas in Aumann's article ``Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality" is exposed and analyzed. The primordial archetypal images that underlie both this literary source and Aumann's work are delineated and are used to explain the great emotive impact...

Aumann has proved that common knowledge of substantive rationality implies the backwards induction solution in games of perfect information. Stalnaker has proved that it does not. Roughly speaking, a player is substantively rational if, for all vertices $v$, if the player were to reach vertex...

This paper analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. This type of analysis sheds light on an important policy question, namely whether there is a difference in treatment between banks which request a rating and those which do not. Using a sample of Asian banks...

This paper develops a partial equilibrium model to account for stylized facts about the behavior of oligarchs, politically and economically strong conglomerates in transition and developing countries. The model predicts that oligarchs are more likely than other owners to invest in productivity...