Showing 1 - 10 of 133
arrangements, corruption affects both bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue in a first-price auction. …We investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413265
asset that is too large or too risky for a single individual or financial institution so that an auction method is not … and a SS is provided. The difference between an auction scheme and a subscription scheme is discussed. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134756
private and common valuations as special cases. We show that the key determinant of bidders' surplus (and implicitly auction … format of the auction matters. If bidders have constant marginal utilities for objects up to some limit, then uniform price … expense of efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135082
Jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer. Such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value. We present field data that suggests such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062369
We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118642
Consider an auction in which $k$ identical objects are sold to $n>k$ bidders who each have a value for one object which … not prohibitively high, then the equilibrium price in a uniform price auction will not aggregate private information, in … mechanism for which there exist equilibria and for which (weak) efficiency is achieved as the economy grows in the face of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135078
This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market … determined by means of a clearinghouse double auction with discriminatory mid-point pricing. Buyers and sellers use Roth …-Erev individual reinforcement learning to determine their price and quantity offers in each auction round. It is shown that market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412999
We study the implementation of constrained-efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching function. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561074
We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner's "revenue'' among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118596
We analyze the role resale creates for zero-value bidders, called speculators, in standard auctions with symmetric independent private values buyers. English/second-price auctions always have equilibria with active resale markets and positive profits for a speculator. In first- price/Dutch...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561846