Showing 1 - 10 of 118
In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. First, if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal's offer; the dominant-strategy implementation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550916
The siting of noxious facilities often involves externalities that extend beyond the border of the community selected as a site. Thus, the private information of each community is potentially a vector of costs comprising a cost for each of the possible sites. I characterize the conditions for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118594
We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner's "revenue'' among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118596
We propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the sellers' reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial website gives consumers the possibility to rate credibly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407517
There has been an explosion of new forms of communications media for interpersonal communication. There is anecdotal evidence of people suffering from 'information overload' as a result of these developments. This paper presents the results from, and analysis of, a case study of a perceived...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407519
In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407521
This paper examines the political economy of redistribution when voters have asymmetric information about the redistributive preferences of politicians and the latter cannot make credible policy commitments. The candidates in each party are endogenously selected by a process of Nash Bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407535
Many couples do not sign prenuptial agreements, even though this often leads to costly and inefficient litigation in case of divorce. In this paper we show that strategic reasons may prevent agents from signing a prenuptial agreement. Partners which have high productivity in marital activities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407538
In this paper we use a non cooperative equilibrium selection approach as a notion of stability in link formation games. Specifically, we follow the global games approach first introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), to study the robustness of the set of Nash equilibria for a class of link...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407549
This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in {\em dynastic governments}. It has been suggested that ``horizontal accountability," i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407554