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Litigation and the Political Clout of the Tobacco Companies: Cigarette Taxes, Prices, and the Master Settlement Agreement

Sloan, Frank A.; Trogdon, Justin G. - EconWPA - 2004

The goal of our empirical analysis is to assess whether the changes in cigarette excise taxes and cigarette prices can be attributed to litigation brought by the states and the resulting settlements, holding other factors constant. Using pre-post as well as state excise taxes on beer as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134622

Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance

Edlin, Aaron S. - EconWPA - 1999

Americans drive 2,360,000,000,000 miles each year, far outstripping other nations. Every time a driver takes to the road, and with each mile she drives, she exposes herself and others to the risk of accident. Insurance premiums are only weakly linked to mileage, however and have largely lump-sum...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561012

The Tobacco Deal

Bulow, Jeremy; Klemperer, Paul - EconWPA - 1999

[Forthcoming in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity] We analyse the major economic issues raised by the 1997 Tobacco Resolution and the ensuing proposed legislation that were intended to settle tobacco litigation in the United States. By settling litigation largely in return for tax increases,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561528

Booms, Busts, and Fraud

Povel, Paul; Singh, Rajdeep; Winton, Andrew - EconWPA - 2003

We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors … can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives … funded without committing fraud, whereas in bad times investors are more vigilant and it is harder to commit fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134707

Optimal Audit Policy and Heterogenous Agents

Ratto, Marisa; Vergé, Thibaud - EconWPA - 2003

Frauds can be explained not only in terms of individual willingness to cheat, but may also be driven by opportunities to behave dishonestly. The audit policy should therefore be different for different categories of agents. This paper focuses on the optimal audit policy when there are two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412503