This paper rectifies a design problem in the Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market Model. Due to a faulty mutation operator, the resulting bit distribution in the classifier system was systematically upwardly biased, thus suggesting increased levels of technical trading for smaller GA-invocation...

We examine whether a simple agent--based model can generate asset price bubbles and crashes of the type observed in a series of laboratory asset market experiments beginning with the work of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). We follow the methodology of Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) and...

Fictitious play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since the already classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of Nash equilibria has been established for some important classes of games, including weighted potential games, supermodular games...

Professional experts offer advice with the objective of appearing well informed. Their ability is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. We model this situation as a reputational cheap-talk game with continuous signal, state, and ability type spaces....

We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: "regret-matching." In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It is shown that our adaptive procedure...

In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental...

The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...

This paper presents a micro-model of knowledge creation through the interactions among a group of people. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in...

This paper studies an adaptive artificial agent model using a genetic algorithm to analyze how a population of decision-makers learns to coordinate on the selection of an equilibrium or a social convention in a two-sided matching game. In the contexts of centralized and decentralized entry-level...