OIL AS AN ENERGY PROPELLER, IS THE LARGEST INTERNATIONALLY TRADED COMMODITY THAT SHOWS HIGHLY VISIBLE INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE DETERMINATION OF ITS INVESTMENT, PRODUCTION, TRADE AND PRICING POLICIES. THIS UNIQUENESS, NO DOUBT DEMANDS A WELL ARTICULATED OIL POLICY FOR AN OIL...

Tipping is a multi-billion-dollar phenomenon that challenges the traditional assumption of selfish economic agents who have no feelings and do not care about social norms. This article reviews the early history of tipping and offers an economic analysis of different aspects of tipping. Using the...

Under court rulings, the jurisdiction can require the developer to bear only those public-sector costs that relate reasonably to his project. To avoid a lawsuit by the developer over cost estimates, planners can offer him his choice of sets of conditions that would attach to land-use permits....

Planners wish to avoid a lawsuit by the developer over their cost estimates of the public works required by his project. To avoid a suit, they can offer him his choice of several sets of conditions that would attach to land-use permits. In computer simulations of five such short- and long-term...

Conventional wisdom tells us that with no market failure and local non- satiation of preferences, the core is at least as large as the collection of competitive equilibrium allocations. We confirm this for a standard model featuring land. Next we consider the public land ownership version of the...

Small jurisdictions vie for economic development by relaxing pollution controls. This can cause damaging spillovers. Many policy analysts recommend replacing the small jurisdictions with a single authority that taxes development. But as the sole producer of development rights to a unique area,...

Using an urban land use model in which jobs and residences are spatially dispersed and mixed, we treat the general equilibrium of land, labor and product markets and the trade-off between labor supply, commuting and discretionary travel. We show that the decentralization of population and of...

When ability to avoid rent control is randomly distributed over landlords, housing may rise above its free market level. Landlords evading part of rent-control are like suppliers selling to a perfectly price-discriminating monopsonist. A continuum of evasive abilities gives a range of low rent...