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Brusco, Sandro; Jackson, Matthew O. - EconWPA - 1997

We study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two-period market given that agents arrive at different times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously. First period agents face a fixed cost of trading across periods, and their decisions of whether or not to trade in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077051

Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good

LiCalzi, Marco; Nicolò, Antonio - EconWPA - 2005

This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077064

Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies

Jackson, Matthew O.; Kremer, Ilan - EconWPA - 2003

We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of robust approximate implementation in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135032

Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining

Jackson, Matthew O.; Palfrey, Thomas R. - EconWPA - 1997

bargain through some extensive game form. We take an implementation approach, characterizing the possible allocation rules …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062338

Gewährleisten umgesetzte WTO-Streitschlichtungsurteile offene Märkte? Eine Betrachtung am Beispiel des Zeitschriftenfalles

Zimmermann, Thomas A. - EconWPA - 2005

the implementation of rulings. Against this background, it is puzzling that the specific WTO procedure which deals with … allegedly insufficient implementation is used only in about one third of the cases where the need for implementation has arisen …. Yet, a closer look at the where implementation has allegedly occurred can partly resolve this puzzle: The defendant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408038

SELF-SELECTION UNDER NON-ORDERED VALUATIONS: TYPE-SPLITTING, ENVY-CYCLES, RATIONING AND EFFICIENCY

Nahata, Babu; Kokovin, Serguei; Zhelobodko, Evgeny - EconWPA - 2003

We analyze self-selection problem when valuations are non-ordered. The corresponding package-pricing solution has specific graph structure. It is helpful in deriving weak su±cient conditions for both partial e±ciency and Pareto-e±ciency. Unlike the ordered valuations case, Pareto e±ciency is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556519