This paper studies how the trade size and the historical sequence of trades affect bid-ask spreads, investors’ trading strategies, and the market maker’s learning process in a multi-period economy. First, we show that there is a nonzero cut-off size below which informed traders never buy or...

Evidence contrasting insider trades in the U.S. between high- and low- jeopardy periods and across firms at high and low risk for 10b-5 litigation indicates insiders condition their trades on foreknowledge of price-relevant public disclosures, but avoid profitable trades when jeopardy due to...

This paper builds a model of fragmented duopsony in backward agriculture following Basu and Bell (1991) in which the purchasers (traders) have captive markets each but compete in a contested market. We focus on the formation of captive markets through trader-farmer interlinkage in the form of...

Population games are stochastic processes which explicitly model Nash's (1950) mass action interpretation of Nash equilibrium. The mass action interpretation envisions a population of players for each position in the game, and that players are randomly matched for play. The hope is that the...

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two- player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces...

We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny (1999) and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy $\varepsilon-$equilibria for all epsilon0. We show by examples that there are: (1)...

A social game is a generalization of a strategic-form game, in which not only the payoff of each player depends upon the strategies chosen by their opponents, but also their set of admissible strategies. Debreu (1952) proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium in social games with continuous...