Can a strategy of targeting macro projections be the only guide for monetary policy actions, or could it cause macroeconomic instability in the face of imprecise information? The paper examines how the precision of the indicators affects determinacy in a model with partial information and an...

The analogy between Hayekian monetary dynamics and the Friedman/Phelps accelerationist hypothesis is more problematic than some commentators have been prepared to admit. Hayek´s presentation of the 1930s did not produce a convincing argument in defense of the proposition that accelerating...

This paper is the sequel to chapter 30 of the 1999 first edition of The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (ed. J. Backhaus). A new section has been added entitled 'An application of Hayekian law and economics: the comparative analysis of alternative monetary and banking regimes'.

Recent empirical research found that the strong short-term relationship between monetary aggregates and US real output and inflation, as outlined in the classical study by M. Friedman and Schwartz, mostly disappeared since the early 1980s. In the light of the B. Friedman and Kuttner (1992)...

A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch implies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under different pricing...

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in...

The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...

We introduce a class of two-player cooperation games where each player faces a binary decision, enter or exit. These games have a unique Nash equilibrium of entry. However, entry imposes a large enough negative externality on the other player such that the unique social optimum involves the...