Showing 1 - 7 of 7
We study both theoretically and experimentally the decisions players make in two queueing games with batch service. In both games, players are asked to independently decide when to join a discrete-time queue to receive service, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. Equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062725
We study a class of interactive decision making situations in which each agent must choose to participate in one of several lotteries with commonly known prizes. In contrast to the widely studied paradigm of choice between gambles in individual decision making under risk, the probability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556674
A basic property of any normative theory of decision making --- individual or group --- is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125604
We study experimentally a class of pure coordination games as a special case of the Consumer Choice of Prizes game developed by Rapoport et al. (2000). We find a high level of group coordination coupled with considerable switching in the choice of locations. Two models are proposed and tested to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408213
We study search behavior in a generalized "secretary problem" environment in which consumers search sequentially for the best alternative from a known and finite set of multi-attribute alternatives. In contrast to most previous studies, we make no distributional assumptions about the quality of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408222
Tacit coordination is studied experimentally in a class of iterated market entry games with a relatively small number of potential entrants (n = 6), symmetric players, and fixed entry fees. These games are intended to simulate a situation where a newly emergent market opportunity may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408234
We consider embedding independent within-group conflicts for the provision of public goods in a between-group competition for an exogenously determined prize as a structural mechanism for reducing free riding. We model this situation by a multi-level collective action game in which the group<92>s...</92>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062729