We consider a model with two backbones and a finite number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) connected to the backbones. ISPs decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering to costs. Intra-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to the same...

We consider a model with two backbones and a finite number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) connected to the backbones. ISPs decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering to costs. Intra-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to the same...

We develop a model, in which Internet backbone providers decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points. Backbone providers compete by setting capacities for their networks, capacities on the private...

We develop a model, in which Internet backbone providers decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points. Backbone providers compete by setting capacities for their networks, capacities on the private...

Comparative advertising by one brand against another showcases its merits versus the demerits of the other. In a two-stage game among finitely many firms, firms decide first how much to advertise against whom. In the second stage, given the advertising configuration, firms compete as Cournot...

Comparative advertising by one brand against another showcases its merits versus the demerits of the other. In a two-stage game among finitely many firms, firms decide first how much to advertise against whom. In the second stage, given the advertising configuration, firms compete as Cournot...

We present a general equilibrium model that encompasses the endogenous selection of a set of tradeable commodities. At its foundation we introduce the notion of a trade infrastructure as a set of social institutions describing the trade and production technologies available to the agents in the...

We extend the results of Mas-Colell (1980) and Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) on valuation equilibria and the relationship of cost share equilibria with the core. We allow for any finite number of private goods and a set of public projects without any structure. We show the two welfare theorems for...