We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results …

his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be …

his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be …

A large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the possibility of one or more players …

trust and cooperation through reputation and without an external enforcer is an open question. We therefore explore through …-shot trust game with a reputation mechanism. In every interaction, a buyer has complete information about a seller's past … the one hand, some minimal fraction of buyers must make use of the sellers’ reputation in their buying strategies and, on …

The ability of a long-lived seller to maintain and profit from a good reputation may induce her to provide high quality … share it with the community and acquire a reputation for gossiping. Reputations function in tandem: sellers provide high … made public, while information holders share their information as a reputation for doing so results in higher effort from …