Showing 1 - 10 of 374
Corruption scandals seem to abound in countries that have recently undergone reform. Despite the proliferation of …—actually causes an increase in corruption. Theory provides no guidance as to the direction of causality—on the one hand, reforms make … politicians accountable to voters, as well as introduce more competition, which should decrease corruption. On the other hand, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125949
’s corruption levels. Examining a large sample of countries covering a 20-year long period, we found robust empirical support for … the fact that increases in import openness do indeed cause reductions in corruption, a crucial aspect of governance. The … corruption is close to one third of that exercised by the level of development. Some cautious policy conclusions are derived. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408075
Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 percent -- why? On the one hand, because Japanese prosecutors are badly understaffed they may prosecute only their strongest cases and present judges only with the most obviously guilty defendants. On the other, because Japanese judges can be reassigned by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076633
lose under free trade, unless the world price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in the … world market, countries tend to over-export the contested resource relative to what we would observe if there were no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408071
We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560979
This paper generalizes previous existence results on unidimensional electoral competition, by extending the traditional two-party electoral game to the case where parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118547
In this paper we investigate how “civil service” personnel management interacts with bureaucratic discretion to create high capacity, expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We build a model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship specific) policy expertise, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076581
This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in {\em dynastic governments}. It has been suggested that ``horizontal accountability," i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407554
Important conceptualizations of both interest groups and bureaucratic agencies suggest that these institutions provide legislatures with greater information for use in policy making. Yet little is known about how these information sources interact in the policy process as a whole. In this paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560982
This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076606