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Blume, Lawrence - EconWPA - 1996

Population games are stochastic processes which explicitly model Nash's (1950) mass action interpretation of Nash equilibrium. The mass action interpretation envisions a population of players for each position in the game, and that players are randomly matched for play. The hope is that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407624

Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.

Monteiro, Paulo Klinger - EconWPA - 1999

In this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413285

The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest

Bayer, Ralph C; Sutter, Matthias - EconWPA - 2004

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities investing costly effort in the concealment and detection of tax evasion. We show that these socially inefficient efforts - as well as the frequency of tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062718

A contest with the taxman - The impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources

Bayer, Ralph C - EconWPA - 2004

concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and … increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we …nd conditions under which a government should enforce incentive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556902

Finding out who the crooks are - Tax evasion with sequential auditing

Bayer, Ralph C - EconWPA - 2004

This paper investigates multi-item moral hazard with auditing contests. Although the presented model is widely applicable, we choose tax evasion as an exemplary application. We introduce a tax-evasion model where tax authority and taxpayer invest in detection and concealment. The taxpayers have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556958

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters' Turnout?

soubeyran, raphael - EconWPA - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of … contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players …, job promotion competitions, or sport contests. We study the general model of contest with attacks and defence and propose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560971

Pushing the Prize Up, A Few Notes on Al-Qaeda's Reward Structure and the choice of Casualties

Caruso, Raul; Locatelli, Andrea - EconWPA - 2005

The article aims at suggesting possible conjectures on Al-Qaeda's logic and structure. Even if the organization's secrecy makes any empirical evidence difficult to find, some insight can be provided by economic theory of contests: in this terms, Al-Qaeda can be acknowledged like an agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408420

Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players

Carmona, Guilherme - EconWPA - 2003

We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an $\varepsilon_n$-equilibria, with $\varepsilon_n$ converging to zero. In our characterization, the sequence of finite games...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118535

On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition

Saporiti, Alejandro - EconWPA - 2005

winning the election, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. Although this game has discontinuous payoffs, it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118547

Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players

Carmona, Guilherme - EconWPA - 2004

We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players (Mas-Colell (1984)) in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. For the concept of $(\epsilon,\epsilon)$ - equilibrium --- in which the fraction of players not $\epsilon$ - optimizing is less than $\epsilon$ ---...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118589