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Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.

Monteiro, Paulo Klinger - EconWPA - 1999

In this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413285

The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest

Bayer, Ralph C; Sutter, Matthias - EconWPA - 2004

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities investing costly effort in the concealment and detection of tax evasion. We show that these socially inefficient efforts - as well as the frequency of tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062718

Pushing the Prize Up, A Few Notes on Al-Qaeda's Reward Structure and the choice of Casualties

Caruso, Raul; Locatelli, Andrea - EconWPA - 2005

The article aims at suggesting possible conjectures on Al-Qaeda's logic and structure. Even if the organization's secrecy makes any empirical evidence difficult to find, some insight can be provided by economic theory of contests: in this terms, Al-Qaeda can be acknowledged like an agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408420

A contest with the taxman - The impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources

Bayer, Ralph C - EconWPA - 2004

concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and … increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we …nd conditions under which a government should enforce incentive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556902

Finding out who the crooks are - Tax evasion with sequential auditing

Bayer, Ralph C - EconWPA - 2004

This paper investigates multi-item moral hazard with auditing contests. Although the presented model is widely applicable, we choose tax evasion as an exemplary application. We introduce a tax-evasion model where tax authority and taxpayer invest in detection and concealment. The taxpayers have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556958

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters' Turnout?

soubeyran, raphael - EconWPA - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of … contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players …, job promotion competitions, or sport contests. We study the general model of contest with attacks and defence and propose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560971

Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - EconWPA - 2000

This is an Invited paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and "standard" economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135125

A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions

Isaac, R. Mark; Salmon, Timothy C.; Zillante, Arthur - EconWPA - 2004

Jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer. Such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value. We present field data that suggests such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062369

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Klemperer, Paul - EconWPA - 1999

This paper, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Surveys, provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413297

Prices and the Winner's Curse

Bulow, Jeremy; Klemperer, Paul - EconWPA - 1999

We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118642