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On the Nature of the Corrupt Firm: Where to Situate Liability?

Seubert, Raphaela - EconWPA - 2005

Applying the modern Property Rights Approach to depict employment and firm-internal delegation relationships, this paper addresses the question how to prevent corporate bribery. The analysis and the answers that follow take into account interaction effects between firm-internal delegation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561039

Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002

Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo - EconWPA - 2003

This paper presents estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561191

The Objectives of Sexual Harassment Law, with Application to 1998's Ellerth, Oncale, and Faragher Decisions

Rasmusen, Eric - EconWPA - 1999

Imposing liability on a company for sexual harassment by supervisors cannot be justified as promoting equality between the sexes, protection of workers, or protection of the owners of the company. Such liability might be justified to prevent breach of contract or behavior offensive to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076533

Why Are There Explicit Contracts of Employment?

James, Harvey; Johnson, Derek - EconWPA - 2002

understanding of two fundamental problems that arise when agency relationships are established between a worker and firm. The first … is that agency relationships often require the creation of specific property rights in order for firm owners to realize … productive efficiencies of scale or scope from agency. The second is that the economic characteristics of the agency relationship …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076642

Corporate Diversification and Agency

Hermalin, Benjamin E.; Katz, Michael L. - EconWPA - 1994

can otherwise be explained by, the agency relationship between securities holders and managers. We argue that the value of … diversification in an agency relationship derives not from its effects on risk, but rather from its effects on the principal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134525

Why Funds of Funds?

Lai, Richard Kum-yew - EconWPA - 2005

Private equity funds of funds (FOFs) have become big business. Today, FOFs form 14% of new money raised. I test six explanations for the rise of FOFs. First, I find that FOFs do not generally deliver superior returns. They do, however, do well enough for the limited partners (LPs) that hire...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134791

Three Union Regulations for Environment Protection Agency: A Game with 12 bank notes

Mullat, Joseph - EconWPA - 2001

the interaction of interests between companies and environment protection agency, which takes into account the nature …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407567

AGENCY, ASSOCIATIONS AND CULTURE: A THALE OF STATE AND SOCIETY

Talpos, Ioan; Dima, Bogdan; Enache, Cosmin; Mutascu, … - EconWPA - 2005

theoretical foundation, elements resumed by a set of critical postulates and a special definition of state as the dominant agency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408429

Do Tender Offers Create Value? New Methods and Evidence

BHAGAT, SANJAI; DONG, MING; HIRSHLEIFER, DAVID A.; … - EconWPA - 2004

We develop the Probability Scaling Method, which rescales short-window announcement period returns; and the Intervention Method, which uses returns associated with intervening events, to estimate value improvements from tender offers. These methods address biases in conventional techniques,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413073

A Tale of Two Wages: Separating Contract from Governance

Harvey S. James Jr. - EconWPA - 1997

This paper distinguishes between governance structure and contractual form. The basic premise is that researchers often confuse these two concepts when they develop or empirically test models within the transaction cost framework. In the paper I utilize a simple principal- agent model to show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561837