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Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004
punishment increased the more the norm was violated. Likewise, up to roughly 60% of the third parties punished violations of the …’’ third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that thirdparty punishment games are powerful tools for studying the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125599
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The impact of coordination and information on transport procurement
Brusset, Xavier - EconWPA - 2005
Transport cost is second in importance after production cost in industry. It is the purpose of the present paper to study the impact of information sharing and contractual instruments between a supply chain and its transport suppliers. After reviewing the literature, we propose a model to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561824
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A PUSH TO GEORGE ( IN ) BUSH
DR.VSR.SUBRAMANIAM - EconWPA - 2005
An imperative need has arisen to provide a Constructive push to the President Bush. American population, Corporate units, Expatriates and all nations with their currency related to US $, are not happy in the current $ dipping situation. Even the currencies of poor nations are galloping upward in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556940
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Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions
Posner, Richard; Rasmusen, Eric - EconWPA - 1999
Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are created or modified. The sanctions for violation of a norm can be categorized as automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral- costly, and multilateral-costly. Problems in creating and enforcing norms are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076640
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Social norms and human cooperation
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004
The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076756
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The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations
Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1995
Experimental results on the ultimatum game show clearly that (1) large fractions of players offer a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair (but positive) offers are systematically rejected. We offer an explanation of this behavior using the 'indirect evolutionary approach' which is based on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407564
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Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?
Nikiforakis, Nikos - EconWPA - 2004
possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public goods experiment based on Fehr and Gaechter (2000) where we allow … group when antisocial behavior is observed. In many circumstances, however, we can not allow for punishment and exclude the … for both punishment and counter-punishment. We find that in both Partner and Stranger treatments average contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408219
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Altruistic Punishment in Humans
Fehr, Ernst; Gaechter, Simon - EconWPA - 2003
show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation …. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We … show that cooperation ¯ourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413255
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Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - EconWPA - 2003
This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish non-cooperators. We call this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413263
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When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non- Cooperation
Houser, Daniel; Xiao, Erte; McCabe, Kevin; Smith, Vernon - EconWPA - 2005
particular, under severe sanction threats most trustees return the desired amount, while under weak threats the most common …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556667