Theoretical study identifying one modality with conditions necesary for the financial stabilization of an inherently unstable system; and 5040 other unstable dynamic modes. It draws on knowledge made available by the academic field of Control Engineering.

The first generaation of competition laws in Central and Eastern Europe -- enacted in 1990 and 1991 in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Russia -- have undergone significant amendments following their earliest enforcement period. This paper uses an analytical framework previously used to...

Antimonopoly laws must contain effective provisions for the attack of exclusionary behavior by firms with market power while at the same time not attacking procompetitive behavior by entrants or incumbents. This paper suggests seven textual criteria by which a new law may be evaluated in its...

This paper analyzes if vertical foreclosure can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of an infinitely repeated game. Foreclosure is profitable due to a 'raising rival's costs' effect but it is not a Nash equilibrium of the static game. The results are that foreclosure is in fact a subgame perfect...

I study Cournot competition under incomplete information about demand while assuming that market price must be non-negative for all demand realizations. Although this assumption is very natural, it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature. Yet it has important economic consequences:...

I study Cournot competition under incomplete information about demand while assuming that market price must be non-negative for all demand realizations. Although this assumption is very natural, it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature. Yet it has important economic consequences:...

Search engines hold the key to helping consumers access the wealth of information on the web. In this paper I examine the evolution of and competition in the internet search engine market. The goal of my analysis is to examine whether early entrants benefit in the long-run from their first-mover...

(forthcoming Journal of Political Economy). Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a "toehold" bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its...

Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a ``toehold'' bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a...