We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. New buyers arrive on the market probabilistically, and are each endowed with a constant private value. Moreover, objects also arrive on the market at random times, so the number...

This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions in independent private value envi- ronments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for sub- mitting a bid,...

Consider an all-pay auction with interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for the case of two players. In contrast with the second-price auction, making budgets more severe can depress the bids of unconstrained bidders

We analyze the effects of resale through bargaining in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. The possibility of resale affects bidders' strategies, and hence the allocation of the objects on sale and the seller's revenue. Our experimental design consists of four...

This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participation costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that there always exists an equilibrium for this...

We analyze how the possibility of resale affects efficiency in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders using a combination of theory and experiments. The resale market is modeled as an unstructured bargaining game between auction bidders. Our experimental design consists of...

We develop a model of a dynamic market with randomly arriving participants. Both buyers and sellers arrive probabilistically over time. The valuation of each buyer for each object is independently distributed and private information to each buyer. Equilibrium prices are determined by a sequence...

When a seller gives a buyer a right of first refusal, although it reduces the competing buyers' profits and creates an inefficiency, it always increases the joint profit of the seller and the right holder. Right of first refusal with a consideration (e.g., a payment from the right holder to the...

This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous-time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model ("automated sellers") maximize the seller's expected surplus relative to a heuristic belief function,...

We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised...