In interim economies with asymmetric information, we show a robust failure of the core convergence theorem. We begin by showing that the coarse core of Wilson (1978) does not converge to any set of price equilibrium allocations considered in the literature. To prove our main point we construct a...

We define a segregation ordering as a ranking of cities from most segregated to least segregated. \ We propose a set of basic properties that any reasonable segregation ordering should have. \ We then fully characterize the class of segregation orderings that satisfy these basic properties. \ We...

The aim of the paper is to introduce the modern techniques of evolutionary game theory introduced into economics by Young (1993) and others to analyze exchange economies. <br> We define a dynamic matching process on the simple housing problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974) and analyze the...

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience....

Multiplicity of Mixed Bayesian Equilibria in Mechanisms Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra The literature on implementation with incomplete information has often left out the consideration of mixed-strategy equilibria. This is particularly problematic for a research program that attempts to address...