Within the heterogeneous independent private values model, we analyze bidder collusion at first and second price single …-object auctions, allowing for within-cartel transfers. Our primary focus is on (i) coalitions that contain a strict subset of all … or the amount paid. To analyze collusion, a richer environment is required than that required to analyze non …

-price auctions with two bidders and in first-price complete information auctions. In each of these cases, the competitive effect … disappears as the level of cross ownership goes to zero. English auctions in complete information environments, however, generate …

auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are …

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities. That is, they offer …-price and second-price auctions) are not well defined unless the set of securities is restricted to an ordered set. For example …

Most of the literature on auctions assumes that the auctioneer owns the object on sale. However most auctions are … type of collusion between a dishonest rival and the auctioneer. In a first price auction, an honest bidder can become more …

Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions … than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions require congregating all bidders for a fixed time interval … paper studies whether such inefficiencies can be removed by implementing a survival auction mechanism. Survival auctions are …

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities. That is, they offer …-price and second-price auctions) are not well defined unless the set of securities is restricted to an ordered set. For example …