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of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation, the escalation of liability … the state. Our paper presents a strategic model of litigation under a negligence rule. We extend Spier's (1997 …) theoretical framework on litigation by explicitly modeling frivolous lawsuits. In this way, we capture the main welfare effects of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063694
promotes unnecessary litigation (Dodson, 2000), the escalation of liability insurance premiums and over-deterrence. In an … strategic model of liability and litigation that incorporates agency problems between the plaintiff and its attorney and court … deterrence and litigation outcomes and find a predictability threshold beyond which the deterrence effect of punitive awards …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699597
that reforms that reduce the firm's expected litigation loss also affect the firm's expenditures on accident prevention … on liability and litigation and extends it in a number of ways. First, we incorporate the split-award statute into the … framework. Second, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique litigation stage equilibrium that survives the universal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699599
, plaintiffs are more willing to accept lower settlement offers and therefore, the firm's expected litigation loss is lowered under … this statute. It is important to note, however, that the reduction in the firm's expected litigation loss will affect its … a strategic model of litigation under asymmetric information to investigate the effect of the split-award reform on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702607
" itself implies) typically enjoy discretion, both in their ultimate decisions and in their conduct of litigation: the legal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342203
This paper assesses the effects of agency costs and asymmetric information in credit markets. Asymmetric information and agency costs occur whenever lenders delegate control over resources to borrowers, leading to adverse selection, moral hazard and monitoring costs because of the inability to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342290
This paper investigates the economic principles underlying the relationship between the real sector (non-financial) and the banking sector structures. Most literature has so far focused on the structure of conglomerates (Keiretsu/Chaebol) in East Asia in explaining the fast economic growth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342309
To investigate players' incentives in coalition formation, we consider a legislative bargaining game with asymmetric information about time preferences. The force that does not exist in usual bargaining games with unanimity is that due to majority rule, if a player signals himself as the patient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342329
It is known that stock returns are affected by monetary policy. This paper theoretically and empirically investigates whether asymmetric information between the Federal Reserve and the public causes the relation between stock returns and monetary policy actions. The paper concludes that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130171
I argue in favor of a competitive screening approach for studying the question of coalition formation in exchange economies under asymmetric information. I obtain a new notion of core that refines Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is nonempty under the standard regularity conditions. I also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130196