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two two-tier hierarchies, the principal designs contracts for both agents. In delegation with a three-tier hierarchy, the …-a-vis centralization, document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and the distribution of total surplus, and … discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063551
outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority. Hence, delegation can provide a way to manipulate the principal …'s ex post reputation. In general, the principal keeps the authority too often when she has the opportunity of delegation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130229
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decision makers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702681
This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342201
We investigate game theoretic models of entwork formation that are based on individual actions only. Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles. (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent. (2) Link formation should be costly. (3) The class of network payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342278
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130219
We derive an almost non cooperative (ANC) analytical payoff function for all three-agent Aumann-Myerson (1988) games, and tractable ones exist for all three-agent A-M-like network games with any fixed valuation, in contrast to restricted results in the literature, if at all. Unlike link proposal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702641
equilibrium outcomes, and we fully characterize the supportable networks. If externalities are nonpositive and a convexity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702654
We study a repeated Nash demand game, where bargainers follow a fictitious play procedure after their one-shot decision on demand in the initial period. In the reduced static game they play at the initial period, all the epsilon-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702751
for externalities, substitutabilities and complementarities. Firms' cost parameter is private information and is … independently distributed across firms. Externalities are type dependent. This has two consequences: first, even though the private …, which makes the use of variational methods possible. A further consequence of having type-dependent externalities, which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328894