The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms, and blocking may similarly be organized by an incentive compatible mediation plan. Nonemptiness is proven for games with a balanced structure

We extend the $\Delta$-rationalizability (see Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003) to infinite strategic form games with incomplete information. The most important feature of the $\Delta$-rationalizability is that there is no specified epistemic type space \`{a} la Harsanyi. However, we can impose a...

This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority and consult the agent (an expert), or delegate the authority to the agent; however, the outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of...

I construct a model of equilibrium unemployment where workers and firms enter into dynamic labor contracts. The model is in the spirit of the models of efficiency wages (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in that I rely on moral hazard to give rise to involuntary unemployment. Compared the...

A (pure) strategy in a repeated game is a mapping from histories, or, more generally, signals, to actions. We view the implementation of such a strategy as a computational procedure and attempt to capture in a formal model the following intuition: as the game proceeds, the amount of information...

In this paper, an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game is considered. The model has a two-tier relationship; two firms make a self-enforced collusive agreement and each firm writes a law-enforced contract to its privately-informed agent. The main finding is that in optimal collusion, interaction...

Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings. We study when and how turn taking can be supported as an equilibrium outcome in a class of repeated games, where the stage game is a symmetric two-player mixed-interest game with asymmetric joint-payoff-maximizing outcomes that may...

We solve in closed form the optimal consumption / portfolio choice problem for the class of isoelastic utility functions under incomplete information about the mean return of the stock price. Our approach consists in converting the original investor's problem into an equivalent program where the...

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience....

In this paper we experimentally investigate decentralized, organizational learning. The main objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We use versions of a simple "success-or-failure" game due to...