What brings persistence into the macroeconomy? This is one of the big unresolved issues in current macroeconomic theory. Economic models, in fact, typically struggle to imply levels of persistence comparable to those observed in the data. Most of the persistence is therefore introduced by highly...

This paper assesses the effects of agency costs and asymmetric information in credit markets. Asymmetric information and agency costs occur whenever lenders delegate control over resources to borrowers, leading to adverse selection, moral hazard and monitoring costs because of the inability to...

We study unofficial dollarization, i.e., the use of foreign money alongside the domestic currency, in an environment where spatial separation and limited communication create a role for currency and banks arise endogenously to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. Unofficial...

We study unofficial dollarization, i.e., the use of foreign money alongside the domestic currency, in an environment where spatial separation and limited communication create a role for currency and banks arise endogenously to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. Unofficial...

We consider a general equilibrium model where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Agents have stochastic preferences and face random buying and selling opportunities. We show that the Friedman rule is just the second best policy. However, the Friedman rule is Pareto optimal. It requires...

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...

In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...

Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at sequential English auctions when bidder valuations are draws from one of several different classes of distributions; i.e., in the presence of asymmetries. When the...

We analyze the two-bidder discriminatory auction with downward sloping marginal valuations and a continuous, variable award. We allow for a common component in marginal valuations and affiliation. We focus on problems that admit solutions with strictly downward sloping bidding schedules. Using...