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Experimental Analysis of the Reputational Incentives in a Self Regulated Organization

José Luis Lima R.; Javier Nuñez E. - Econometric Society - 2004

Self regulation is a mechanism of quality vigilance that is frequently used in credence good industries. The providers in these markets generally form a Self Regulated Organization (SRO), composed by some members of the industry, whose main job is to convince consumers through an active...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129771

Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: A Generalization of the Existence Theorem

Coimbra-Lisboa, Paulo C. - Econometric Society - 2004

Dow and Welang (1994) extended the notion of Nash equilibrium for two-player finite normal games when players are uncertainty on the behavior of his opponents. They showed the existence of equilibrium for any given degree of uncertainty however constant over all possible events, except the null...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129793

Noisy evolution in normal form games

Kuzmics, Christoph - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper analyzes a stochastic model of evolution in normal form games. The long-run behavior of individuals in this model is investigated in the limit where mutation rates tend to zero, while the expected number of mutations, and hence population sizes, tend to infinity. It is shown that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129796

Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol

Wen, Quan; Suh, Sang-Chul - Econometric Society - 2004

Consider a multilateral bargaining problem where negotiation is conducted by a sequence of bilateral bargaining sessions. We are interested in an environment where bargaining protocols are determined endogenously. During each bilateral bargaining session of Rubinstein (1982), two players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129805

Impact of higher-order uncertainty

Yildiz, Muhamet; Weinsten, Jonathan - Econometric Society - 2004

In some games, the impact of higher-order uncertainty is very large, implying that present economic theories may be misleading as these theories assume common knowledge of the type structure after specifying the first or the second orders of beliefs. Focusing on normal-form games in which the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129808

The Mushroom Treatment: Information Suppression and Misrepresentation in Organizations

Croson, David C.; Weber, Thomas A. - Econometric Society - 2004

The ââ‚¬Å“mushroom treatmentââ‚¬? is a common metaphor for the practice of ââ‚¬Å“keeping employees in the dark and feeding them a steady diet of bull manure.ââ‚¬? We develop a model of this practice of information suppression and misrepresentation within organizations,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130154

Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

Snyder, Susan; Ray, Indrajit - Econometric Society - 2004

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130182

Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria

Stauber, Ronald - Econometric Society - 2004

characterization of robust equilibria, since they can be defined in relation to a selection from the equilibrium correspondence that … maps common knowledge priors to corresponding equilibria. For finite games, I derive a precise characterization of such a … selection. Specifically, this characterization implies that an admissible selection can be discontinuous and does not require …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130188

Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games

Vohra, Rajiv; Serrano, Roberto - Econometric Society - 2004

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130219

A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability

Luo, Xiao; Chen, Yi-Chun - Econometric Society - 2004

Within the context of strategic interaction, we provide a unified framework for analyzing information, knowledge, and the "stable" pattern of behavior. We first study the related interactive epistemology and, in particular, show an equivalence theorem between a strictly dominated strategy and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130251