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Regime Selection as an Alternative to the Grubel-Lloyd Index

Lee, Honggue - Econometric Society - 2004

Abstract This paper contends that the regime selection probability can provide an â€œempirically justifiableâ€ alternative to the GL index as a measurement of intra-industry trade. The regime selection probability is an average of sample selection probability that each trade flow data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702730

Coordination, Specialization and Incentives: An Equilibrium Model of Firm Boundaries

Mathewson, Frank; Horstmann, Ignatius J. - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper derives firm boundaries as the outcome of an equilibrium coordination mechanism. The analysis is premised on the notion that efficient production and distribution are achieved through a mechanism that coordinates three basic activities: i) input acquisition, ii) production, iii)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328943

Electronic Markets, Search Costs and Firm Boundaries

Sankaranarayanan, Ramesh; Sundararajan, Arun - Econometric Society - 2004

We study how firm boundaries are affected by the reduction in search costs when business-to-business electronic markets are adopted. Our paper analyzes a multi-tier industry in which upstream parts suppliers incur procurement search costs, and downstream manufacturers incur incentive contracting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063689

Product Market Competition and the Boundaries of the firm

Bettignies, Jean-Etienne de - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper studies the effects of product market competition on vertical integration. In a duopoly setting, each retailer is associated with a manufacturer who must decide how to allocate property rights over the retail asset. Choosing delegation of property rights over vertical integration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699681

Holdup with Subsidized Investment

Hanazono, Makoto - Econometric Society - 2004

A holdup model is analyzed in which one party, the seller, has an investment project that the other party, the buyer, can subsidize. The investment project remains the seller's; she cannot transfer her entire control rights to it. In particular, she can always refuse to allow the buyer to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086412

Allocation of Decision-Making Authority with Principal's Reputation Concerns

Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; Tamada, Yasunari - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority and consult the agent (an expert), or delegate the authority to the agent; however, the outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130229

The Organization of Supply: a Vertical Equilibrium Analysis

Levy, Nadav - Econometric Society - 2004

production, and choose the size of their supplier network if outsourcing. Firms find it optimal to share the same set of … admits multiple vertical equilibria that are Pareto-ranked, the one with the highest level of outsourcing being most … efficient. Outsourcing is more likely in larger markets and when the economies of scope are stronger. The size of the optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702679

Collusion with Internal Contracting

Lee, Gea M. - Econometric Society - 2004

In this paper, an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game is considered. The model has a two-tier relationship; two firms make a self-enforced collusive agreement and each firm writes a law-enforced contract to its privately-informed agent. The main finding is that in optimal collusion, interaction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086421

Internet Exchange Formation and Competition When Potential Participants Can Coodinate

Nickerson, Jack A.; Owan, Hideo - Econometric Society - 2004

We analyze the formation and competition of market intermediaries when there are positive participation externalities between the two sides of the market; negative participation externalities within the same side; competition with traditional market; and implicit coordination among potential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130174

Delegating Procurement to Experts

Lewis, Tracy; Dai, Chifeng - Econometric Society - 2004

Buyers frequently delegate purchase decisions to sellers who are better informed about supply options and the cost of service. This paper analyzes how buyers optimally contract with sellers who vary in their expertise at prescribing service. We show that the most expert suppliers offer the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130176