Showing 1 - 10 of 39
The importance of infrastructure for growth is well established in the macroeconomic literature. Previous research has treated public investment in infrastructure as exogenous. We remedy this shortcoming by providing a political economy analysis of infrastructure choice based upon consumer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702622
renegotiations. This paper presents a systematic framework for studying non-cooperative games with group incentives, and offers a …-repeated games with discounting every equilibrium outcome can be supported by a stationary set of optimal penal codes as in Abreu … (1988). In addition, I prove existence of equilibrium both in stage games and in repeated games, and provide an iterative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342239
The no trade principle asserts that risk-neutral agents are not prepared to trade if and only if a common prior exists. The purpose of this article is to provide general versions of this principle. We first study the case when no topological assumption is made on the state space. Bets are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342381
This paper analyzes how the gossip process can be manipulated by biased people and the impact of such manipulation on information transmission. In this model, a single piece of information is transmitted via a chain of agents with privately known types. Each agent may be either objective or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130172
responsibility. While this generic problem can arise in many contexts, we have chosen to model it in a simple voting situation where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130238
Within the context of strategic interaction, we provide a unified framework for analyzing information, knowledge, and the "stable" pattern of behavior. We first study the related interactive epistemology and, in particular, show an equivalence theorem between a strictly dominated strategy and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130251
In its standard “public choice” form, the mechanism-design framework abstracts from institutional and technological constraints beyond those that the modeler can represent in the definition of states, outcomes, and preferences. This abstraction can create a useful simplification. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063593
Admati and Perry (1987) derive the equilibrium in a bargaining game between a seller and buyer when the buyer's valuation is private information. They show that, for some parameter values, trade occurs at the Rubinstein (1982) prices given the buyer's true valuation (pl if the buyer has a low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063605
Punitive damage awards have been widely criticized for generating a plaintiff’s windfall (i.e., a payment in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation, the escalation of liability insurance premiums and over-deterrence. In an attempt to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063694
This paper analyzes and structurally estimates a synchronization game. Agents take part in an activity and benefit from the participation of others. Coordinated actions are fruit of correlated effects as well as endogenous interactions. Standard tools applied in optimal stopping problems for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170255