We consider a general equilibrium model where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Agents have stochastic preferences and face random buying and selling opportunities. We show that the Friedman rule is just the second best policy. However, the Friedman rule is Pareto optimal. It requires...

This paper examines the production aspect of money to bridge between the search-theoretic models and the canonical Walrasian growth models. In this paper, we argue that money can generate real effects via technology choice (high vs. low), we model explicitly the pattern of exchanges to explore...

This paper uses the neoclassical growth model to identify the effects of technological change on the US business cycle. In the model there are two sources of technological change: neutral, which affects the production of all goods homogeneously, and investment-specific. Investment-specific...

This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of bilateral matching mechanisms and studies their properties in a systematic manner. By providing a unified framework to study ilateral matching mechanisms, we formalize how different spatial/informational constraints can be implemented...

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...

In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...

The optimal organizational form and optimal incentive contract are characterized for a team of money managers, assuming that the investor (principal) is risk averse and that each manager's (agent's) actions affect both that manager's expected return and the correlation of returns between...

This paper models individual choices of social groups and the formation of group identity, and examines the conditions with which the group identity reinforces the productivity of individuals. A social group is defined as a network that provides with a market for interactions to its members....

A (pure) strategy in a repeated game is a mapping from histories, or, more generally, signals, to actions. We view the implementation of such a strategy as a computational procedure and attempt to capture in a formal model the following intuition: as the game proceeds, the amount of information...

We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...