We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the incomplete information game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes...

In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate their behavior perfectly, and thus support cooperative outcomes with the threat of punishments. But with even a small amount of private monitoring, players' private histories may lead them to have...

Traders with short horizons and privately known trading limits interact in a market for a risky asset. Risk-averse, long horizon traders supply a downward sloping residual demand curve that face the short-horizon traders. When the price falls close to the trading limits of the short horizon...

We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent’s private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction environments, we show that the revenue equivalence...

Traders with short horizons and privately known trading limits interact in a market for a risky asset. Risk-averse, long horizon traders supply a downward sloping residual demand curve that face the short-horizon traders. When the price falls close to the trading limits of the short horizon...