offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number … equilibria survive. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation in repeated games …

-person alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large …. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation and efficiency in repeated games …

bargaining in the presence of externalities. Similarly to Segal's work, we prove our results for highly general settings, and …

We study perfect information bilateral bargaining game with an infinite alternating-offers procedure, in which we add … utility than what she was offered in earlier stages of the bargaining, namely, a ``worse off'' outcome. In a strong version of …

's temporary wage to upset the union's incentive to strike, decreasing the union's bargaining power, and shrinking the set of …

offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number … equilibria survive. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation in repeated games …

, and tractable ones exist for all three-agent A-M-like network games with any fixed valuation, in contrast to restricted …

-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution when the bargainers are patient. As the … division of the Nash bargaining solution. …

formed if members of the coalition are connected on a communication network, or a graph. We offer a characterization of non …-manipulable division rules without any assumption on the structure of communication network. As corollaries, we obtain a number of earlier … characterization results established with the assumption of complete network (complete graph) in various specialized settings. Moreover …