Similar Search Results

Coordination, Specialization and Incentives: An Equilibrium Model of Firm Boundaries

Mathewson, Frank; Horstmann, Ignatius J. - Econometric Society - 2004

's perspective -- but also by the ability of the coordination mechanism to provide incentives for efficient activity levels as …This paper derives firm boundaries as the outcome of an equilibrium coordination mechanism. The analysis is premised on … perfectly competitive setting, this coordination activity is accomplished via a price mechanism that coordinates the decisions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328943

Strategic R&D Delays Generate Market Power

Iyigun, Murat F.; Chen, X. Maggie - Econometric Society - 2004

We develop an economic growth model in which both the R&D resources to develop new product applications and the market structure of consumption goods manufacturing are determined endogenously. There exists uncertainty with respect to the development date of an inaugural product, although higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342266

Is Perfectly Competitive Innovation Compatible with the Free Software Ethic?

Turnbull, Stephen J. - Econometric Society - 2004

In a truly remarkable contribution, Boldrin and Levine demonstrate that under certain conditions "first-copy costs" of innovation can be funded by revenues from sales of copies without resort to government franchise such as patent and copyright. Advocates of "free software", software licensed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702734

Social Interactions in a Synchronization Game

Paula, Aureo de - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper analyzes and structurally estimates a synchronization game. Agents take part in an activity and benefit from the participation of others. Coordinated actions are fruit of correlated effects as well as endogenous interactions. Standard tools applied in optimal stopping problems for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170255

Achieving Intertemporal Efficiency and Symmetry through Intratemporal Asymmetry: (Eventual) Turn Taking in a Class of Repeated Mixed-Interest Games

Mui, Vai-Lam; Lau, Sau-Him Paul - Econometric Society - 2004

Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings. We study when and how turn taking can be supported as an equilibrium outcome in a class of repeated games, where the stage game is a symmetric two-player mixed-interest game with asymmetric joint-payoff-maximizing outcomes that may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702715

School Choice, Incentives, and Academic Outcomes: Evidence from Chile

Gallego, Francisco A. - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper examines the effects of inter-school competition on student outcomes by using exogenous variation in the availability of private schools in Chile. Given that naïve estimates of the effects of competition on student outcomes are biased by endogenous entry of schools, this paper uses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328880

The Effect of the Payroll Tax on Earnings: A Test of Competing Models of Wage Determination

Lang, Kevin - Econometric Society - 2004

Under the standard competitive model, if a tax change affects a group of workers with highly inelastic labor supply, their earnings will fall by essentially the entire nominal employer share of the tax increase. Allowing the wage to play a motivational role but maintaining the market-clearing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328957

”Can They Take it With Them? The Portability of Star Knowledge Workers' Performance: Myth or Reality?”

Groysberg, Boris; Nanda, Ashish - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper examines the portability of star security analysts’ performance. Analysis from a panel data set of research analysts in investment banks over 1988-1996 reveals that star analysts who switch employers show an immediate decline in performance, which persists for at least five years....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329003

Evaluating Incentive Options

Xiong, Wei; Sircar, Ronnie - Econometric Society - 2004

cost, exercising strategies, and induced incentives. Especially, we highlight some significant interactions among different …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329033

Contracting with altruistic agents under moral hazard

AUBERT, Cecile - Econometric Society - 2004

In principal-agent settings with moral hazard, the fact that agents are altruistic vis-a-vis third parties (e.g. their family) modifies incentive costs. We derive sufficient conditions for the principal to benefit from altruism. They bear on how altruism affects the agent's marginal rate of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342252