stable networks under the hypothesis of mutual consent for the case of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs … network formation. We provide comparisons of the resulting networks with networks satisfying well known stability concepts …

results in the literature, if at all. Unlike link proposal game A-M and Myerson (1986), ANC has dynamic bilateral cooperation …

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … transfers on the links they are directly involved with, then there are many settings where inefficient networks are the only … equilibrium outcomes, and we fully characterize the supportable networks. If externalities are nonpositive and a convexity …

-equilibria are clustered around the division corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution when the bargainers are patient. As the … division of the Nash bargaining solution. …

equilibria survive. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation in repeated games … offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number …

. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation and efficiency in repeated games …-person alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large …

bargaining in the presence of externalities. Similarly to Segal's work, we prove our results for highly general settings, and …

We study perfect information bilateral bargaining game with an infinite alternating-offers procedure, in which we add … utility than what she was offered in earlier stages of the bargaining, namely, a ``worse off'' outcome. In a strong version of …