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Advertising Dynamics and Competitive Advantage

Doraszelski, Ulrich; Markovich, Sarit - Econometric Society - 2004

Can advertising lead to a sustainable competitive advantage? To answer this question, we propose a dynamic model of advertising competition where firms repeatedly advertise, compete in the product market, and make entry as well as exit decisions. Within this dynamic framework, we study two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702675

Collusion with Internal Contracting

Lee, Gea M. - Econometric Society - 2004

main finding is that in optimal collusion, interaction between intra-firm (internal) contracting and inter-firm collusion … may be exploited; inter-firm collusion may enhance the efficiency of internal contract, and conversely, internal … contracting may facilitate collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086421

Vertical Control and Horizontal Coordination in Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Supergame Experiment in Gasoline Markets

Wang, Zhongmin - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper examines empirically the playersâ€™ intrabrand vertical price control, interbrand horizontal pricing coordination, and their learning process to equilibrium in a rare natural experiment of supergame where a well defined simultaneous-move price setting stage game is repeated every...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130148

Networks of Relations

Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Lippert, Steffen - Econometric Society - 2004

In this paper, we model networks of relational contracts. We explore sanctioning power within these networks under different information technologies depending on the shape of the network. The value of the relational network lies in the enforcement of cooperative agreements which would not be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329020

Divide et Impera. Optimnal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - Econometric Society - 2004

agent that defects from fines and from other agents' punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion, in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329023

Delegated Management in Dynamic Oligopolies

Petkov, Vladimir - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper studies the strategic value of delegation in dynamic interactions, where principals provide managers with intertemporal incentives in order to obtain a competitive advantage. While direct management offers intertemporal commitment opportunities, the separation of ownership from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342160

The Nature of Equilibria under Noncollusive Product Design and Collusive Pricing

Zhao, Gongyun; Rath, Kali P. - Econometric Society - 2004

It is well known that in a two stage duopoly model of product choice with quadratic transportation cost, the firms locate at the extreme endpoints of the market. This paper examines this model in an infinite horizon setting where in the initial period the firms choose locations and in subsequent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702523

Specialization, Agency Cost and Firm Size

Cho, Sungbin - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper extends the principal-agent model to determine the size of the firm as measured by the number of agent hired. Hiring more agents results in benefits and costs to the principal. The benefits are gains from specialization: higher productivity can be achieved if, as the number of agents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342377

The Effect of Cross Ownership on Competition in Auction Markets

Waehrer, Keith; Greenlee, Patrick - Econometric Society - 2004

We consider a model where bidders in an auction own passive partial claims over their rivals’ auction profits. While the cross ownership confers no ability to directly affect bidding behavior, the claims on rival profits dampen bidding competition. It is not uncommon for enforcement agencies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329010

Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

Spiegel, Yossi; Gilo, David - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in rivals. When firms … are identical, only multilateral partial cross ownership (PCO) facilitates tacit collusion; the incentives of firms to … collusion further by investing directly in rival firms and by diluting his stake in his own firm. In the presence of cost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063700