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In this paper, we model networks of relational contracts. We explore sanctioning power within these networks under different information technologies depending on the shape of the network. The value of the relational network lies in the enforcement of cooperative agreements which would not be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329020
agent that defects from fines and from other agents' punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion, in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329023
We consider competitive bidding for a business license, via an open ascending-price auction, between two symmetric incumbents and a potential entrant, each of whom is privately informed about her own valuation of the license. Entry stands to reduce the payoff of each incumbent below that in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342186
main finding is that in optimal collusion, interaction between intra-firm (internal) contracting and inter-firm collusion … may be exploited; inter-firm collusion may enhance the efficiency of internal contract, and conversely, internal … contracting may facilitate collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086421
giving a “veto” power to the agent. This, in turn, restricts the manipulation of report by the supervisor. Thus, the exit … robust to the case under collusion between the supervisor and the agent. We also examine the optimal size of the exit option …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129818
Within the heterogeneous independent private values model, we analyze bidder collusion at first and second price single … or the amount paid. To analyze collusion, a richer environment is required than that required to analyze non … coalition at a second price auction captures the entire collusive gain. For collusion to be effective at a first price auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699652