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It is well-known that subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium does not eliminate incentives for joint-deviations or renegotiations. This paper presents a systematic framework for studying non-cooperative games with group incentives, and offers a notion of equilibrium that refines the Nash theory in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342239
Within the context of strategic interaction, we provide a unified framework for analyzing information, knowledge, and … our approach are: (i)unlike the ad hoc semantic model of knowledge, the state space is constructed by Harsanyi’s types …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130251
Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings. We study when and how turn taking can be supported as an equilibrium outcome in a class of repeated games, where the stage game is a symmetric two-player mixed-interest game with asymmetric joint-payoff-maximizing outcomes that may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702715
Most existing results of evolutionary games restrict only to the Nash equilibrium. This paper introduces the analogue of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new notion of evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC) and prove that it generalizes ESS. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702729
The no trade principle asserts that risk-neutral agents are not prepared to trade if and only if a common prior exists. The purpose of this article is to provide general versions of this principle. We first study the case when no topological assumption is made on the state space. Bets are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342381
This paper analyzes how the gossip process can be manipulated by biased people and the impact of such manipulation on information transmission. In this model, a single piece of information is transmitted via a chain of agents with privately known types. Each agent may be either objective or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130172
Suppose an agent is contemplating an action with state-contingent payoffs, and has a prior belief about the probability of the states. She hires an expert to update her priors before the action. Experts may be both informed as well as uninformed, and are not necessarily truthful. The question...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130238
Punitive damage awards have been widely criticized for generating a plaintiff’s windfall (i.e., a payment in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation, the escalation of liability insurance premiums and over-deterrence. In an attempt to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063694
Punitive damage awards have been widely criticized for their unpredictability (2004 Economic Report of the President) and for generating a plaintiff’s windfall (i.e., a payment in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation (Dodson, 2000),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699597
In an attempt to reduce the liability insurance costs of firms, several US states have implemented many different kinds of tort reform. Some reforms take the form of caps or limits on punitive damage awards while others have mandated that a proportion of the award be allocated to the plaintiff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699599