The paper shows that fighting corruption with leniency programs -- reductions of the legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously report to law enforcers -- may be highly counterproductive. These programs are typically ``moderate,'' in the sense of only reducing, or at best cancelling the...

In this paper, we model networks of relational contracts. We explore sanctioning power within these networks under different information technologies depending on the shape of the network. The value of the relational network lies in the enforcement of cooperative agreements which would not be...

Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Optimally designed "courageous" leniency programs reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all...

We take the view that alternative trading opportunities may influence the loss to delay in a bargaining situation, and show that contractual exclusivity may then be relevant even for ‘internal’ investments, contradicting a recent finding by Segal and Whinston (2000). When a buyer is an...