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Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods
Swarthout, James T.; Shachat, Jason - Econometric Society - 2004
We consider two mechanisms to procure differentiated goods: a request for quote and an English auction with bidding credits. In the request for quote, each seller submits a price and the inherent quality of his good. Then the buyer selects the seller who offers the greatest difference in quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342347
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Experimental Analysis of the Reputational Incentives in a Self Regulated Organization
José Luis Lima R.; Javier Nuñez E. - Econometric Society - 2004
Self regulation is a mechanism of quality vigilance that is frequently used in credence good industries. The providers in these markets generally form a Self Regulated Organization (SRO), composed by some members of the industry, whose main job is to convince consumers through an active...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129771
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Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
Snyder, Susan; Ray, Indrajit - Econometric Society - 2004
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130182
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Noisy evolution in normal form games
Kuzmics, Christoph - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper analyzes a stochastic model of evolution in normal form games. The long-run behavior of individuals in this model is investigated in the limit where mutation rates tend to zero, while the expected number of mutations, and hence population sizes, tend to infinity. It is shown that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129796
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Equilibrium or Simple Rule at Wimbledon? An Empirical Study
Tang, Cheng-Tao; Hsu, Shih-Hsun; Huang, Chen-Ying - Econometric Society - 2004
plays in our data pass all the tests in Walker and Wooders (2001). However, we argue that not only the test on equal winning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702613
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The performance of reverse auctions versus request for quotes when procuring goods with quality differences
Swarthout, J. Todd; Shachat, Jason - Econometric Society - 2004
The use of dynamic auctions is a major component in many enterprises' e-procurement initiatives. In the case where suppliers offer goods and services of inherently different quality the traditional mechanism has been the request for quote. In a request for quote, suppliers submit a sealed bid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329013
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Network Externalities, Demand Inertia, and Dynamic Pricing in an Experimental Oligopoly Market
Bayer, Ralph-C; Chan, Mickey - Econometric Society - 2004
prices over time (increasing returns to scale, learning by doing or inter-temporal price discrimination). We use a laboratory … experiment to test this prediction. We find that the observed price path in the experiment is consistent with the real …-world observation of deceasing prices rather than with the game theoretic prediction. Even if we allow for learning (repeated markets …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342145
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A Dynamic Analysis of the Evolution of Conventions in a Public Goods Experiment with Intergenerational Advice
Graziano, Sara; Chaudhuri, Ananish; Maitra, Pushkar - Econometric Society - 2004
to highlight the learning that occurs over time. Our estimation results show that contributions in any period depend …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342167
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Do Informal Sanctions Increase Cooperation in the Long Run?
Noussair, Charles; Tucker, Steven - Econometric Society - 2004
We conduct an experiment to explore the durability and transferability of the increase in contributions to a public good resulting from the existence of a particular type of implicit informal sanction. Rege and Telle (2003) find that in one-shot games, the sanctioning system leads to high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130161
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Survival Auctions
Ye, Lixin; Kagel, John; Pevnitska, Svetlana - Econometric Society - 2004
Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions require congregating all bidders for a fixed time interval, which has limited field applicability and introduces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063602