We offer a simple general equilibrium model to analyze how economy-wide forces (i.e. shocks to terms of trade, technology and endowments) will affect the intensity of social conflict over the distribution of resources. Examples of conflict activities range from crime to civil war. We show that...

This paper empirically estimates a murder supply equation for the United States from 1965 to 2001 within a cointegration and error correction framework. Our findings suggest that any support for the deterrence hypothesis is sensitive to the inclusion of variables for the effect of guns and other...

This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the socialwelfare loss that results from the regime's inability to...

Rational beliefs (in the form of WAMS measures) are expectations which though consistent with empirical observations, may deviate from the true underlying probability measure under which data is generated.We provide results on, as well as a decomposition of, WAMS measures and use this to...

This paper provides a general approach in the framework of a complete markets stochastic overlapping generations model to assess whether debt Ponzi schemes are feasible and Pareto-improving. We derive conditions in terms of bond interest rates of different maturities which can be used to assess...

Rational beliefs (in the form of WAMS measures) are expectations which though consistent with empirical observations, may deviate from the true underlying probability measure under which data is generated.We provide results on, as well as a decomposition of, WAMS measures and use this to...

Valuation of the benefits from the preservation of water resources is often of interest to policy makers and funding institutions. In developing countries, valuation studies are potentially useful for designing funding policies when inequality is a concern. To fulfil this goal, however,...

This paper formulates a model of dynamic, endogenous reform of political institutions. Specifically, a class of dynamic political games (DPGs) is introduced in which institutional choice is both recursive and instrumental. It is recursive because future political institutions are decided under...

We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium larger elections are characterized by a...