Showing 1 - 10 of 10
" itself implies) typically enjoy discretion, both in their ultimate decisions and in their conduct of litigation: the legal …, but not perfectly. A second means of controlling discretion is through monitoring of adjudication itself (such as by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342203
of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation, the escalation of liability … the state. Our paper presents a strategic model of litigation under a negligence rule. We extend Spier's (1997 …) theoretical framework on litigation by explicitly modeling frivolous lawsuits. In this way, we capture the main welfare effects of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063694
promotes unnecessary litigation (Dodson, 2000), the escalation of liability insurance premiums and over-deterrence. In an … strategic model of liability and litigation that incorporates agency problems between the plaintiff and its attorney and court … deterrence and litigation outcomes and find a predictability threshold beyond which the deterrence effect of punitive awards …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699597
that reforms that reduce the firm's expected litigation loss also affect the firm's expenditures on accident prevention … on liability and litigation and extends it in a number of ways. First, we incorporate the split-award statute into the … framework. Second, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique litigation stage equilibrium that survives the universal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699599
, plaintiffs are more willing to accept lower settlement offers and therefore, the firm's expected litigation loss is lowered under … this statute. It is important to note, however, that the reduction in the firm's expected litigation loss will affect its … a strategic model of litigation under asymmetric information to investigate the effect of the split-award reform on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702607
' court expenditures. These expenditures make litigation costly for the parties, and, therefore, in equilibrium they settle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328878
In this study, we use two new data sets on crime and victimisation in Argentina. The first of these is province-level official data over the period 1992-2002. The second data set is the crime victimization survey for the city of Buenos Aires and its main surburbs, which has been conducted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170260
We study a model of civil dispute with delegation in which a plaintiff's lawyer works on a contingent fee basis but a defendant's lawyer on an hourly fee basis. We first derive the conditions under which delegation to the lawyers brings both the plaintiff and defendant more payoffs, compared to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342327
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by accepting the settlement of an arbitrator. The impact of pragmatic arbitrators -that enforce concessions that precede their appointment - is compared with that of arbitrators that act on principle -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170253
In its standard “public choice” form, the mechanism-design framework abstracts from institutional and technological constraints beyond those that the modeler can represent in the definition of states, outcomes, and preferences. This abstraction can create a useful simplification. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063593