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Endogenous Asymmetry and Entry in Sequential Multi-Unit Auctions: Identification and Estimation
Gupta, Sudip - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper analyzes bidding behavior in a multi period multiple unit auction. While bidders are ex ante symmetric, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702642
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The Effect of Cross Ownership on Competition in Auction Markets
Waehrer, Keith; Greenlee, Patrick - Econometric Society - 2004
We consider a model where bidders in an auction own passive partial claims over their rivals’ auction profits. While …-value auction, we find that such cross ownership has an effect similar to reducing the number of bidders while holding constant the … distribution of the highest value in the auction. A similar decrease in competition occurs in independent private-value second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329010
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Precautionary Bidding in a Dynamic Model of Discrete Noncooperative Entry Deterrence
Varma, Gopal Das - Econometric Society - 2004
We consider competitive bidding for a business license, via an open ascending-price auction, between two symmetric …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342186
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Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions
Araujo, Aloisio; Filho, Luciano I. de Castro - Econometric Society - 2004
We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328867
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Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities
Skreta, Vasiliki; Figueroa, Nicolas - Econometric Society - 2004
In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328894
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The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions
Weinschelbaum, Federico; Arozamena, Leandro - Econometric Society - 2004
particular form of corruption on bidding behavior in a single-object, private-value auction with risk-neutral bidders. Bidders … type of collusion between a dishonest rival and the auctioneer. In a first price auction, an honest bidder can become more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063558
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Efficient Partnership Dissolution under Buy/Sell Clauses
Kittsteiner, T.; Frutos, De; M-A - Econometric Society - 2004
When a partnership comes to an end partners have to determine the terms of the dissolution. A well known way to do so is by enforcing a buy/sell option. Under its rules one partner has to offer a price for the partnership and the other agent can choose whether she wants to sell her share or buy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005170270
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Ordinal Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions
Chakraborty, Archishman; Gupta, Nandini - Econometric Society - 2004
Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328976
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Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
McAdams, David - Econometric Society - 2004
Existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium is established in the discriminatory and uniform S + a-th price (a in [0, 1]) auctions of S identical objects when bidders are risk-neutral with independent signals. The model requires discrete price / quantity grids and allows for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342189
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Optimal Common Value Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
Singh, Rajdeep; Povel, Paul - Econometric Society - 2004
second-price sealed bid auction that lets the insider win only if his bid is above a hurdle price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699653