The assumption of internationally identical factor intensity techniques may be one of the major causes of the HOV model's poor performance. To relax this assumption, detailed input-output data are required to compute the factor intensity techniques used in different countries; however, these...

This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how...

I argue in favor of a competitive screening approach for studying the question of coalition formation in exchange economies under asymmetric information. I obtain a new notion of core that refines Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is nonempty under the standard regularity conditions. I also...

This talk will describe a stream of research in experimental economics focusing on the illumination and demonstration of other-regarding preferences (ORPs). Evidence will come primarily from public goods experiments, but also bargaining games (ultimatum, dictator, trust, ...

In this paper we characterize the optimal allocation mechanism for $N$ objects, (permits), to $I$ potential buyers, (firms). Firms' payoffs depend on their costs, the costs of competitors and on the final allocation of the permits, allowing for externalities, substitutabilities and...

In this paper we adopt Granovetter's view expressed in his famous article ''Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness'' , where he argues that the concept of man in economics is extremely undersocialized because it ignores the importance of social networks. In so doing...

This paper considers the parametric inference of a wide range of structural econometric models. The class of models considered includes those with parameter-dependent support and those derived from game-theoretic models. Inference of those models has raised some important econometric issues....

This paper analyzes a bilateral trade problem where the seller makes hidden investment that influences the buyer's private valuation. Complete contracts can be written on observable trade decisions. It is shown that efficiency level in investment and trade is negatively related to the scope of...

This paper reports an experiment involving two mechanisms that allocate a single unit of an indivisible private good among two players, at no cost to either of them. Both mechanisms, proposed by Moore (1992) and Perry and Reny (1999), are compared in terms of their relative performance to assign...

Field and experimental research demonstrate the positive relationship between efficiency and both trust and trustworthiness. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (BDM), 1995, first showed the existence and strength of both trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory economic experiment. Building off BDM,...