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General Rationalizability and Its Robustness for Strategic Form Games with Incomplete Information
Hu, Tai-Wei - Econometric Society - 2004
We extend the $\Delta$-rationalizability (see Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003) to infinite strategic form games with … incomplete information. The most important feature of the $\Delta$-rationalizability is that there is no specified epistemic type …. Robustness with respect to almost common belief for rationality of $\Delta$-rationalizability is established under general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702725
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Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the Informed Principal Problem.
Severinov, Grigory Kosenokand Sergei - Econometric Society - 2004
We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342204
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Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria
Stauber, Ronald - Econometric Society - 2004
The standard model of a Bayesian game used in most applications assumes that players' beliefs are derived from a common knowledge prior on preference parameters. I analyze the robustness of equilibria of such games to perturbations in the information structure. In a type space environment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130188
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Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies
Park, In-Uck; Choe, Chongwoo - Econometric Society - 2004
In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make decisions that set directions for the organization, employ subordinates and contract with external suppliers. This paper explains when such delegation of authority can be optimal, using a model of a firm with three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063551
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The Price of Advice
Szentes, Balazs; Eso, Peter - Econometric Society - 2004
We develop a model of consulting (advising) where the role of the consultant is that she can reveal signals to her client which refine the client’s original private estimate of the profitability of a project. Importantly, only the client can observe or evaluate these signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702621
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Endogenous Asymmetry and Entry in Sequential Multi-Unit Auctions: Identification and Estimation
Gupta, Sudip - Econometric Society - 2004
This paper analyzes bidding behavior in a multi period multiple unit auction. While bidders are ex ante symmetric, the first period outcome translates the second period game to a game between asymmetric bidders. The first period outcome determines who will be a strong or a weak bidder in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702642
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Efficient Dissolution of Partnerships and the Structure of Control
Turner, John L.; Ornelas, Emanuel - Econometric Society - 2004
In this paper, we study efficient dissolution of partnerships in a context of incomplete information. We generalize the results of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) to situations where the partnership takes on a common value that may depend upon all partners' types, so that each partner's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702686
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Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games
Vohra, Rajiv; Serrano, Roberto - Econometric Society - 2004
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130219
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Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
Myerson, Roger - Econometric Society - 2004
The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms, and blocking may similarly be organized by an incentive compatible mediation plan. Nonemptiness is proven for games with a balanced structure
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342211
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Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions
Araujo, Aloisio; Filho, Luciano I. de Castro - Econometric Society - 2004
We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in common values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328867