insurance to all types of bidders is always in the set of optimal auctions. In particular, when the bidders' set of priors is … also show that in general, many classical auctions, including first and second price are not the optimal mechanism (even …

auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. When the conditions are not satisfied, we are …

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities. That is, they offer …-price and second-price auctions) are not well defined unless the set of securities is restricted to an ordered set. For example …

Most of the literature on auctions assumes that the auctioneer owns the object on sale. However most auctions are …

Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions … than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions require congregating all bidders for a fixed time interval … paper studies whether such inefficiencies can be removed by implementing a survival auction mechanism. Survival auctions are …