insurance to all types of bidders is always in the set of optimal auctions. In particular, when the bidders' set of priors is … also show that in general, many classical auctions, including first and second price are not the optimal mechanism (even …

Most of the literature on auctions assumes that the auctioneer owns the object on sale. However most auctions are …

Ascending price clock auctions with drop-out information typically yield outcomes closer to equilibrium predictions … than do comparable sealed-bid auctions. However clock auctions require congregating all bidders for a fixed time interval … paper studies whether such inefficiencies can be removed by implementing a survival auction mechanism. Survival auctions are …

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities. That is, they offer …-price and second-price auctions) are not well defined unless the set of securities is restricted to an ordered set. For example …

-object auctions, allowing for within-cartel transfers. Our primary focus is on (i) coalitions that contain a strict subset of all …

How do informational asymmetries between bidders affect the outcome of common value auctions? Should the seller accept …