Bootstrap aggregating or Bagging, introduced by Breiman (1996a), has been proved to be effective to improve on unstable forecast. Theoretical and empirical works using classification, regression trees, variable selection in linear and non-linear regression have shown that bagging can generate...

Instrumental Variables (IV) methods identify internally valid causal effects for individuals whose treatment status is manipulable by the instrument at hand. Inference for other populations inevitably requires some sort of homogeneity assumption. I develop a simple theoretical framework that...

Microfinance programmes provide poor people with small loans given to jointly liable self-selected groups. Follow-up loans provide incentives to repay. In an experiment we investigate the influence of those features on strategic default. Each group member invests in an individual risky project,...

We consider the problem of consistent estimation of nonlinear models with mismeasured explanatory variables, when marginal information on the true values of these variables is available. The marginal distribution of the true variables is used to identify the distribution of the measurement...

This study addresses the complexity in modeling contingent valuation surveys with true zeros and non-ignorable missing responses including “don’t knows†and protest responses. An endogenous switching tobit model is specified to simultaneously estimate the parameters of the...

The federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) are the largest means-tested transfer programs for low-income working parents in the United States. Together, these two programs cost nearly $50 billion per year and comprise the bulk of the social safety net for...

This paper formulates a model of dynamic, endogenous reform of political institutions. Specifically, a class of dynamic political games (DPGs) is introduced in which institutional choice is both recursive and instrumental. It is recursive because future political institutions are decided under...

We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium larger elections are characterized by a...

Spatial models of voting behaviour are the dominant paradigm in political science. Consistent with this approach, it will be the case that, ceteris paribus, voters should vote for the party nearest to them on the political spectrum. A key question is how we measure nearness or distance. We...

We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...